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ABSTRACT 
During the October 2006 Term, the United States Supreme Court will 
consider the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment 
plans as employed in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No.1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education. These cases 
will mark the Court’s first inquiry regarding the use of race to combat de facto 
segregation in public education.  This article examines the constitutionality of 
such plans and provides a prediction regarding the Court’s decisions. 
The article begins with an analysis of the resegregation trend currently 
plaguing American educational institutions and identifies two causes for the 
occurrence: (1) the shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
desegregation and (2) school officials’ adherence to the “neighborhood school 
concept” when making student assignment decisions.  The article then examines 
the challenged plans, specifically their attempts to create and maintain racially 
diverse student bodies through the use of racial tiebreakers and guidelines.  After 
considering the Supreme Court’s prior decisions and rationale regarding the use 
of race in education, the article predicts that the Supreme Court will strike down 
both plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.  In light of this probable 
outcome, the article urges school officials to consider race-neutral methods to 
achieve diversity and to improve the quality of education provided to 
disadvantaged, minority students.      
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, after a twenty-five year hiatus,1 the Supreme Court reentered the 
passionate and controversial debate surrounding affirmative action in the context 
of public education.  The Court’s dual decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and 
Gratz v. Bollinger3 sanctioned the limited use of race as a factor in higher 
education admissions decisions.  During the October Term 2006, the Court will 
revisit the issue of affirmative action, only this time the inquiry will concern the 
use of race in elementary and secondary education rather than higher education. 
 In a somewhat surprising announcement, the Court decided to hear the 
appeals of two cases challenging school districts’ use of race in student 
assignment decisions.4 Six months prior to the Court’s decision to hear 
arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 15 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,6 the Court declined 
to grant certiorari in a similar case,7 thereby prompting speculation as to the 
reasons for its apparent about face.  One could attribute the Court’s decision to its 
desire to reconcile circuit court splits regarding the constitutionality of race-
conscious student assignment plans pre- and post-Grutter.8 While this reason 
may be plausible, it would not appear to be the primary reason given that such 
 
1 See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education). 
2 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
3 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
4 See Charles Lane, Justices to Hear Cases of Race-Conscious School Placements, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/05/AR2006060500367.html. 
5 Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted 126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908) [hereinafter Parents II]. 
6 McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Sch., 330 F.Supp.2d 834, 861 (W.D.Ky. 2004), aff’d 
416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 
126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). 
7 See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F.Supp.2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003), 
aff’d 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 798 (2005) (upholding the use of race in 
elementary and secondary education student transfer policies). 
8 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-15, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 
2006 WL 1579631 (detailing circuits’ conflicting holdings regarding the constitutionality of race-
conscious assignment plans and urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari “to remove 
uncertainty and confusion” regarding “how Grutter and Gratz affect the Equal Protection rights of 
students in public high schools”; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 
(No. 05-915), 2006 WL 165912 (arguing that the Court should grant cert because “[t]he decision of 
the Sixth Circuit directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits concerning 
voluntarily-adopted race-based student assignment plans designed to advance racial diversity’); see 
also Lane, supra note 4. 
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splits existed prior to the Court’s certiorari denial in Lynn.9 Others have 
hypothesized that the Court’s decision to grant certiorari was precipitated by the 
change in its composition – a change that some think may prove to be the death 
knell of desegregation.10 
The composition of the Court that declined to hear Lynn included Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, who wrote the 5 to 4 Grutter opinion upholding the use 
of race in higher education.  Often thought of as the “swing vote” in controversial 
and pivotal cases,11 Justice O’Connor retired from the Court in 2006.12 
Following the appointment of her replacement, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who 
is commonly thought to be a conservative justice,13 the newly constituted Court 
agreed to hear Parents Involved and Meredith, which will be the first time the 
Court has addressed the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race in 
elementary and secondary school student assignment plans.  While no one can 
 
9 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, Lynn, 126 S.Ct. 798, 2005 WL 2275949 (noting 
conflicts between the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits regarding the 
constitutionality of public schools voluntarily adopting race-conscious student assignment plans to 
achieve racial diversity). 
10 See Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factor in School Rolls, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/washington/06scotus.html?ex=1307246400&en=7b7b1af6cbe
f8911&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (suggesting that the change in Supreme Court justices 
prompted the Court to grant certiorari); Lane, supra note 4 (quoting Professor Goodwin Liu’s 
thoughts of the Court’s granting of cert as ‘bad news for desegregation advocates…. It looks like 
the more conservative justices see they have a fifth vote to reverse these case.’). 
11 See Tom Curry, O’Connor had immense power as swing vote, July 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304484/ (describing Justice O’Connor as “often the swing vote 
that decided high-profile cases”); Justice O’Connor’s swing vote clout, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9531661/ (detailing six significant Supreme Court decisions, 
ranging from partial birth abortion to state sovereign immunity, in which Justice O’Connor 
provided the fifth deciding vote).  
12 Although Justice O’Connor announced her resignation on July 1, 2005, it was not effective 
until the confirmation of her successor, which occurred on January 31, 2006 with the swearing in of 
Justice Alito. See William Branigin, Fred Barbash & Daniela Deane, Supreme Court Justice 
O'Connor Resigns, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html; Alito 
sworn in as Supreme Court justice, January 31, 2006, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11111624/. 
13 See Alito sworn in, supra note 12 (describing Justice Alito as a “conservative lawyer for the 
Reagan administration”); Don Gonyea, Republicans Praise Alito’s Conservative Credentials,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4983450 (describing Justice 
Alito as “a judicial favorite of the conservative movement”); Bill Mears, Alito's record shows 
conservative judge, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/alito.record/index.html (discussing Justice Alito’s 
“conservative judicial philosophy” and relating views that he was “the most conservative member 
of the” Third Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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know how any of the justices will vote in the cases, many affirmative action 
opponents hope that the additions of Justice Alito and Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr.14 to the Court will result in the prohibition of race-conscious 
assignment programs in public elementary and secondary schools.15 Supporters 
of affirmative action fear that such a ruling will prompt and exacerbate 
resegregation trends currently plaguing public education.16 Whether the Court 
upholds or strikes down the assignment plans employed in the two cases, Parents 
Involved and Meredith will significantly contribute to the jurisprudence 
concerning equality in public education. 
Many agree that public elementary and secondary schools are more 
segregated today than they were prior to the Brown decision.17 Current 
 
14 Following the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed on 
September 29, 2005.  See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief 
Justice, THE WASHINGTON POST, September 30, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html. 
Although void of a lengthy judicial history, Chief Justice Roberts’ commentary regarding race-
based affirmative action prior to taking the bench has led some to believe that he generally opposes 
race-based affirmative action.  
As Acting Solicitor General, Roberts’ approval of a brief opposing the Federal 
Communications Commission’s affirmative action program for broadcast 
licensees and later, as a private attorney, his brief on behalf of the Associated 
General Contractors of America in opposition to the government’s highway 
construction program in Adarand Constructors v. Pena clearly indicate that had 
Roberts sat in the place of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, equal access to higher 
education (Grutter v. Bollinger) and contracting (Adarand v. Pena) would have 
been foreclosed to minorities. 
See American Association for Affirmative Action Opposes Confirmation of John Roberts for Chief 
Justice of U.S. Supreme Court, September 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.affirmativeaction.org/press.jsp (quoting Robert Ethridge, the American Association for 
Affirmative Action’s President).    
15 See Lane, supra note 4 (“Sharon Browne, principal attorney of the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, which supports the parents’ lawsuits [in Parents Involved and Meredith], said she ‘was 
pleased that the Court has decided to hear these cases.  Together, these cases could put an end to 
schools using race as a factor to decide where children can attend school.’”); Greenhouse, supra 
note 9 (quoting Sharon Browne as saying, ‘I think the writing's on the wall, or at least I hope it is.’) 
16 See Gina Holland, Supreme Court to Hear Schools Race Case, CBS NEWS, June 5, 2006, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/politics/mainD8I2AB700.shtml ( “A 
ruling against the schools ‘would be pretty devastating to suburban communities, small towns that 
have successfully maintained desegregation for a couple of generations,’ he said. ‘The same 
communities that were forced to desegregate would be forced to re-segregate.’”) (quoting Gary 
Orfield, Director of the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University); Bob Egelko & Heather Knight, 
Justices take cases on race-based enrollment, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 6, 2006 (noting 
views that the consideration of race in public elementary and secondary schools is necessary to 
“reverse growing resegregation of the schools”). 
17 See Hon. Robert L. Carter, The Conception of Brown, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 99 (2004) 
(concluding that “there are more segregated secondary and primary schools today than existed 
before Brown); Marvin Krislov, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Value, the Method, 
and the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 906 (2004) (concluding that many parts of the country are 
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resegregation trends threaten thirty years of progress that have been made in the 
desegregation of African-American students,18 thereby impeding the fulfillment 
of Brown’s promise of educational equality.  Realizing the potentially 
devastating effects of segregated schools,19 several school districts have 
voluntarily begun to employ race-conscious student assignment plans, such as 
those challenged in Parents Involved and Meredith, to prevent and remedy 
resegregation of their schools.  This article examines the constitutionality of such 
plans and hypothesizes that the Supreme Court will strike down both student 
assignment plans employed in Parents Involved and Meredith as 
unconstitutional.  
Part I begins with an analysis of factors contributing to resegregation in 
elementary and secondary schools.  Just as the Supreme Court has been an 
invaluable tool by which to desegregate public schools, some of its decisions 
have also enabled resegregation to flourish.  Part I also discusses the negative 
impact that school districts’ adherence to the “neighborhood school concept” has 
had on the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students. 
Part II examines the District Court and Ninth Circuit’s opinions in 
Meredith and Parents Involved. It discusses the compelling interests asserted by 
the school districts to justify their narrowly tailored use of race in student 
assignment decisions. 
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment plans as employed in Parents Involved and Meredith. Although 
difficult to predict, this article hypothesizes that the Court will invalidate both 
student assignment plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.  This 
hypothesis is predicated on the Court’s previous decisions and rationale 
concerning the use of race in the context of public education.  
The article concludes with suggestions regarding policies and programs 
that school districts can utilize in their attempts to combat the severe costs 
imposed by racial and economic segregation in public education.  
 
experiencing segregation at levels greater than those existing when Brown was decided); Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown’s Past and Brown’s Future, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 625, 
631 (2005) (noting that “public schools in many areas are more segregated than they were before 
Brown”); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the 
Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 65 (2002) (stating that “public schools 
in many urban communities are more segregated now than they were in the pre-Brown era”).  
18 See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with 
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?, Harvard Civil Rights Project Report 4 (2003), 
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/finalexec.pdf (discussing a 
twelve year decline in the desegregation of African-American students). 
19 See infra Part I (discussing the negative effects of resegregation on public education). 
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I. SCHOOL HOUSE ROCK: RESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Throughout our history, public education has occupied a significant role 
in our society.  Its importance has been the bedrock of legal decisions concerning 
the provision of educational opportunities to undocumented children,20 children 
with disabilities,21 and minority students.22 As recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Brown I:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments…. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.23 
Unfortunately, Brown I’s recognition of the inherent inequality of 
racially segregated schools24 has not prevented such segregation from occurring.  
This section explores two factors that have contributed to the resegregation of 
public educational institutions: first, the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding mandatory desegregation efforts and second, local school districts’ 
adherence to the “neighborhood school concept” when making student 
assignment decisions.  The Supreme Court’s dilution of desegregation mandates 
and school districts’ use of racially segregated neighborhoods as criteria for 
student assignments have both exacerbated the resegregation trends currently 
afflicting public educational institutions. 
 
20 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied public 
education to children not legally admitted to the country). 
21 See Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 526 U.S. 66, 78 (1999) (holding that 
Congress’ intent “‘to open the door of public education’ to all qualified children” required the 
school district to provide nursing services to a quadriplegic student in accordance with federal 
disability law) (citing Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).  
22 See Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I] (invalidating 
segregation of races in public schools); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (upholding the narrowly tailored 
use of race in higher education admissions decisions). 
23 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. 
24 Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”) (emphasis added). 
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A. The Court Giveth, the Court Taketh Away 
 
The attainment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic 
minority students has often been pursued via legal measures.  From Brown I to 
Grutter, Supreme Court intervention has helped to open the school house doors 
for countless numbers of students of color.25 Despite such access, however, 
African-American and Hispanic students continue to lag behind their white 
counterparts in terms of academic achievement.26 This phenomenon can be 
explained, in part, by the environments in which many minority students are 
educated.27 
Due to the resegregation trend experienced by many public schools, an 
astounding number of African-American and Hispanic children are educated in 
racially and economically segregated schools. "[A]lmost three-fourths of black 
and Latino students attend schools that are predominantly minority.”28 Of the 2.4 
million students attending schools that are 99-100% minority, African-American 
and Hispanic students account for 2.3 million.29 Unfortunately, “[t]he schools 
 
25 See Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family 
Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 
(No. 02-241), 2003 WL 539178 (noting that the number of African-American college graduates has 
increased from less than 5% in 1960 to approximately 7.5% in 2000; in addition, the number of 
African-American law students has increased from 1% in 1960 to 7.4% in 1996); Danielle R. 
Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend in our Public Schools, 49 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 & n.4 (2004-2005) (discussing the positive impact of the Brown decision 
on racial integration in public schools); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to 
Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 791 n.4 (2005): 
In 1965, only 15.2% of African-Americans between the ages of twenty-five and 
twenty-nine had attended college; by 1995, that number had risen to 44.9%. 
Among African-Americans in that age bracket, 15.3% had completed four or 
more years of college in 1995, compared to 6.8% in 1965. See James T. 
Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its 
Troubled Legacy 230 (2001) (citation omitted). In the 1990s, college 
enrollment by students of color increased by nearly 50%. See William B. 
Harvey, Am. Council on Educ., Minorities in Higher Education 2001-2002: 
Nineteenth Annual Status Report 2 (2002).  
26 See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing 
the War? 32 J. C. & U. L. 1, 8-9, 25-26 (2005) (discussing racial disparities in educational 
achievement).  
27 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-300 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“African-American and Hispanic children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and 
underperforming institutions”). 
28 Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated 
Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?, Harvard Civil Rights Project Report 28 (2003), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf. 
29 Id.
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that have the highest minority enrollment also have the highest incidence of 
student poverty: In 87% of schools that are over 90% minority (African-
American and Hispanic), over half of the students come from families living in 
poverty.”30 These figures are particular disturbing when one considers the 
disadvantages and challenges that students attending such schools must 
overcome to succeed academically.31 
Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions to help facilitate the 
provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students,32 the Court has 
also issued opinions – three, in particular, referred to as the “resegregation 
trilogy”33 – that have hindered the progress of desegregation.34 The Court’s 
decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,35 Freeman v. 
Pitts,36 and Missouri v. Jenkins37 have relaxed school districts’ responsibilities 
and duties to eliminate all vestiges of racial segregation, thereby permitting the 
premature dissolution of federally mandated desegregation decrees when racial 
imbalance persists.38
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell evidences its reluctance to 
continue taking an active role in the desegregation of public educational 
 
30 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273 (1999). See also Gary 
Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare?, The Civil Rights 
Project - Harvard Univ. 21 (2004),  available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf (concluding that “students 
in highly segregated neighborhood schools are many times more likely to be in schools of 
concentrated poverty”).  
31 See Orfield & Lee, supra note 30, at 21-22 (detailing poverty concentrated school 
disadvantages such as school deterioration, lack of resources, less experienced teachers and fewer 
college preparatory courses).  
32 See supra notes 22 & 25; see also Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430, 437-438 (1968) (placing an “affirmative duty” on school boards operating segregated systems 
“to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 
301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II] (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees that 
mandate the admission of African-American students into public schools “with all deliberate 
speed”). 
33 Ware, supra note 17, at 63. 
34 See id. at 65 (referring to the three cases as “a three-fold shift from an affirmative duty to 
eliminate all vestiges of segregation to acquiescence to resegregation”). 
35 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
36 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
37 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
38 See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in 
Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 465-473 (discussing the impact of 
the three cases on district courts’ decisions to dissolve desegregation orders, “even if desegregation 
actually had not been accomplished”). 
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institutions39 as it had in previous cases.40 The Court’s decision appears to be 
guided by its pronouncement that “federal supervision of local school systems 
was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.”41 To 
hasten the return of educational decisions to local school officials, the Court sets 
forth a less stringent test to determine whether a school system has successfully 
complied with a desegregation decree so as to warrant its dissolution.  Unlike the 
Court’s demand in Green that school boards develop systems “in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,”42 the Dowell Court 
instructs lower courts to ask “whether the Board had complied in good faith with 
the desegregation decree…, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had 
been eliminated to the extent practicable.”43 This test appears to concede the 
point that the complete elimination of segregation is impractical; therefore, 
school districts that demonstrate a good faith effort to desegregate and eliminate 
traces of past discrimination can be released from judicial control and 
supervision even though circumstances remain that hinder desegregation.44 
The Court reiterated the Dowell test in Freeman45 as it continued to chip 
away at the desegregation safeguards that it had previously helped to establish.  
In Freeman, respondents argued that a district court should not relinquish its 
supervision and control over a school system until the school district fully 
 
39 See Holley, supra note 25, at 1090 & n.31 (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins as evidence of its “hostility towards federal court supervision of 
school desegregation”). 
40 See supra note 32; see also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471, 
487 (1982) (striking down a state initiative intended to “interfere with desegregative busing”); 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1971) (upholding the ordering 
of a racial balance requirement and bus transportation as permissible tools of school desegregation).   
41 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added); id. (stating that desegregation decrees “are not 
intended to operate in perpetuity).  Some scholars suggest that such statements evidence the Court’s 
“impatience with the duration of desegregation orders,” or perhaps, “an abandonment of the 
original purpose” of desegregation. See Levit, supra note 38, at 472 & n.91.  
42 Green, 391 U.S. at 438; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that the Supreme Court’s 
objective “remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation”) 
(emphasis added). 
43 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-250 (emphasis added). 
44 See Holley, supra note 25, at 1092 (concluding that the Dowell test excludes the possibility 
of resegregation as a factor for determining unitary status so as to warrant the dissolution of a 
desegregation decree); Levit, supra note 38, at 464-465 (discussing the Dowell test as an invitation 
to lower courts to dissolve desegregation decrees even if segregation continues to exist); Ware, 
supra note 17, at 64 (concluding that the Dowell test allows for a finding of unitary status despite a 
showing that schools remained racially segregated due to housing patterns) 
45 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492. 
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complies with all components of a desegregation decree.46 The Court rejected 
this argument and sanctioned the incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision 
once a school system is determined to be in compliance with certain categories of 
a desegregation order.47 In arriving at its decision, the Court once again relies 
heavily on its desire to return control of school systems to state and local 
officials.48 
Guided by the “ultimate objective…to return school districts to the 
control of local authorities,” the Court reasons that such restoration is “essential 
to restore [local authorities’] true accountability in our governmental system.”49
One must be mindful, however, that local authorities’ previous control of school 
systems resulted in unequal and segregated dual systems – systems that 
necessitated the imposition of court-ordered desegregation decrees in attempts to 
remedy them.  Over ten years passed before the local school officials in Freeman 
took affirmative steps to adhere to the Supreme Court’s mandate that school 
districts desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”50 and such steps were initiated 
only after the respondents filed their lawsuit.51 At the time the Court decided 
Freeman, over thirty-five years had passed since its decision in Brown II;
nevertheless, the local DeKalb County school officials continued to operate a 
school system that was violative of the desegregation order.52 Such failures and 
delayed action should cause district courts and the Supreme Court pause when 
considering the arguably premature return of school systems to local control.  
The Freeman decision may also hinder desegregation efforts because of 
its discussion regarding a school district’s duty (or lack thereof) to remedy racial 
imbalance that continues to exist in its schools.  The respondents in Freeman 
presented evidence demonstrating the continuance of racial imbalance in DeKalb 
County schools.53 Petitioners argued that such imbalance was not caused by 
prior de jure discrimination; rather, it was due to demographic changes within the 
 
46 See id. at 471. 
47 See id. at 490-491. 
48 See id. at 489-490 (“Partial relinquishment of judicial control…can be an important and 
significant step in fulfilling the district court’s duty to return the operations and control of schools 
to local authorities.”). 
49 Id. at 490. 
50 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
51 See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (describing the school system’s reluctant response to 
desegregation mandates). 
52 See id. at 474 (discussing the District Court’s findings that the school system continued to 
be segregated with regards to “teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality 
of education”). 
53 See id. at 476-477. 
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county.54 The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s contention that the 
school district “bore the responsibility for the racial imbalance, and in order to 
correct that imbalance would have to take actions that ‘may be administratively 
awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations.’”55 The Court 
clarified that “[o]nce racial imbalance traceable to the constitutional violation has 
been remedied, a school district is under no duty to remedy an imbalance that is 
caused by demographic factors.”56 When coupled with the Court’s sanctioning 
of the incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision once a school district has 
been deemed to have complied with certain provisions of a desegregation decree, 
this pronouncement begs the question with whom does the duty lie to desegregate 
schools if it does not lie with local school districts?  If, as in Freeman, school 
districts are partially or fully released from their desegregation orders even 
though their minority students continue to attend racially segregated schools, 
then the likelihood of achieving true desegregation in public education and the 
benefits that arise from such educational environments is doubtful. 
School districts’ ability to remedy resegregation of their educational 
institutions may be further hindered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jenkins.
The District Court in Jenkins ordered a variety of educational programs and 
initiatives in its efforts to improve the educational quality of the Kansas City, 
Missouri School District and to eliminate all vestiges of segregation.57 The two 
measures challenged by the State were salary increases for instructional and 
noninstructional staff and remedial quality education programs.58 The State 
argued that the requirement of salary increases for teachers and non-teaching 
staff exceeded the District Court’s remedial authority.59 In upholding the State’s 
challenge, the Supreme Court agreed that a District Court cannot use 
‘interdistrict’ measures to remedy ‘intradistrict’ constitutional violations.60 
Concluding that measures such as salary increases were motivated by the District 
 
54 See id. at 478. 
55 Id. at 485 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 28).  
56 Id. at 469. 
57 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 75-80 (describing District Court’s ordering of class reductions, 
magnet school programs, capital improvements and salary increases as measures to improve 
academic achievement and remedy effects of segregation).  
58 Id. at 80. 
59 Id. at 84. 
60 Id. at 89-98 (citation omitted). 
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Court’s pursuit of ‘desegregative attractiveness,’61 the Court rejected the Eighth 
Circuit’s contention that ‘[v]oluntary interdistrict remedies may be used to make 
meaningful integration possible in a predominantly minority district.’62 This 
rejection greatly restricts District Courts’ ability to fashion effective measures 
that can be used to remedy the devastating effects of segregation.   
Perhaps one of the most harmful lingering effects of segregation is 
minority students’ lack of academic achievement.63 Greater numbers of African-
American students fail to complete high school as compared to white students.64 
African-American students, many of whom attend racial imbalanced schools, 
routinely score lower than their white counterparts on standardized tests.65 
Fewer African-American adults, as compared to white adults, obtain a college 
education.66 Such achievement gaps are due in part to disparities existing 
between teacher quality at poor, minority concentrated schools and their more 
affluent, white counterparts. 
 
61 Id. at 80.  According to the Court, “desegregative attractiveness” refers to the 
implementation of programs and initiatives that will improve the attractiveness of schools within a 
school district such that nonminority students who are not presently attending schools within the 
district will decide to enroll, thereby helping to desegregate the schools. See id. at 98-100. 
62 Id. at 91 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
63 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that segregation has a negative impact on the 
educational development of African-American children); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving 
Equality of Educational Opportunity in the Wake of Judicial Retreat From Race Sensitive 
Remedies: Lessons From North Carolina, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1485 & n.33 (2003) (citing 
research showing segregation’s adverse effects on minority students’ academic achievements);   
Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REV.
563, 586-587 (2004) (discussing research suggesting that segregated educational environments may 
have detrimental effects on the academic development of minority children). 
64 In 2004, the drop out rate for African-Americans age 16-24 was 11.8% as compared to 6.8% 
for Whites.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS 
DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY (2006), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=481.
65 See Keith R. Walsh, Color-blind Racism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
443, 450-451 (2004) (discussing the gap between African-American and white students’ scores on  
standardized admissions tests); Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The 
Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 247, 
267-268 (2005) (footnotes omitted): 
The most recent study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found 
that 70% of minority children attend American schools with majority-minority 
populations.  More than one-third of these children attend schools that are 
comprised of at least 90% African American students. African American 
students continue to score significantly lower than White students on 
standardized tests used in college and graduate school admissions. 
66 See Walsh, supra note 65, at 450 & n.49 (noting that 28% of white adults are college 
educated as compared to 16% of African-American adults and that “[a]s of 2000, only 17.8% of 
African Americans over the age of twenty-five had completed four or more years of college, while 
34% of their white counterparts could say the same”). 
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For example, novice teachers, who are obviously not as qualified as more 
experienced teachers, are disproportionately assigned to high poverty, majority-
minority schools.67 The percentage of high school students attending high-
minority, high-poverty schools that are taught English, science and mathematics 
by “teachers who have neither a major nor certification in the subject they teach” 
is twice the percentage of students encountering the same experience at schools 
with low minority and poverty populations.68 Obviously, such disparities have a 
detrimental impact on minority students’ academic achievement.  If such 
disparities could be rectified, then the positive impact on student achievement 
could be tremendous, and the hope of eliminating all vestiges of segregation 
could become a reality. 
This is what the District Court in Jenkins attempted to accomplish by 
ordering the State to fund salary increases in its desegregation efforts.69 
Remedial measures such as salary increases can positively affect teacher quality 
disparities and, consequently, student achievement disparities, by attracting more 
highly qualified teachers and personnel to minority concentrated schools.  
Exposing minority students to more experienced, more educated and more 
effective teachers will improve their educational opportunities and lessen the 
detrimental effects of segregation and past discrimination.70 Unfortunately, by 
finding that the District Court exceeded its remedial authority by ordering salary 
increases for school personnel, the Supreme Court deprives District Courts of a 
valuable tool in their efforts to eradicate vestiges of segregation and create 
educational equality. 
The establishment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic 
minority students is also threatened by the Court’s admonition regarding the use 
of student achievement levels as a measure to determine partial unitary status.    
After finding that the school district “had not reached anywhere close to its 
‘maximum potential because the District is still at or below national norms at 
 
67 Novice teachers are assigned to minority concentrated schools at twice the rate as those 
assigned to schools with low minority populations.  See Heather G. Peske & Kati Haycock, 
Teaching Inequality How Poor and Minority Students are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality 2, 
available at http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/010DBD9F-CED8-4D2B-9E0D-
91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf.  
68 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2004, OUT-OF-FIELD 
TEACHING BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/section4/indicator24.asp; see also Peske & Haycock, supra 
note 67, at 3 (noting that “in secondary schools serving the most minority students, almost one in 
three classes are assigned to an out-of-field teacher compared to about one in five in low-minority 
schools”).  
69 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80. 
70 See Peske & Haycock,  supra note 67, at 10 (noting research findings indicating the positive 
impact interaction with highly effective teachers can have on low-performing students). 
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many grade levels,’”71 the District Court ordered the State to continue funding 
quality education programs designed to improve the educational achievement of 
all students, especially African-Americans.72 The State challenged the order on 
the grounds that improvement on test scores is not a requirement to achieve 
partial unitary status.73 In upholding the State’s challenge, the Court directed the 
District Court to “sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on” student 
performance on achievement tests in its determination of partial unitary status.74 
Although the District Court maintained that a school district must achieve its 
“maximum potential” regarding its desegregation efforts before it can be deemed 
to have partially complied with a desegregation decree, the Supreme Court 
rejected this test and re-imposed the lower standard of “practicability” as 
articulated in Dowell.75 By rejecting the District Court’s more stringent test, the 
Court invites premature findings of partial unitary status despite the fact that 
minority students continue to suffer from reductions in academic achievement.       
The Court also extends this invitation by its directive to the District 
Court to be mindful of its end goal to return control of a school system to state 
and local officials.76 In its efforts to expedite the return of educational decisions 
to local control, the Court appears to have abandoned its previous stance ‘that the 
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far 
as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like 
discrimination in the future.’77 As shown by the number of schools experiencing 
resegregation following the dissolution of desegregation decrees,78 the 
 
71 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101. 
72 Id. at 73. 
73 Id. at 101. 
74 Id.
75 See id. (stating the partial unitary test as “whether the reduction in achievement by minority 
students attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable)
(emphasis added). 
76 See id. at 102. 
77 Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). 
78 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High-
Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N. C. L. REV.
1375, 1394-1395 (2003) (noting the resegregation consequences flowing from the dissolution of a 
thirty-year-old desegregation decree) (footnote omitted):  
The consequences flowing from the [Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Schools] ruling were swift and dramatic: in the 2002-2003 school year, the 
number of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools with minority enrollment of 91% to 
100% more than doubled from the previous year-- from seven elementary 
schools in 2001-2002 to sixteen in 2002-2003, and from two middle schools to 
four. There was no change in the number of elementary and middle schools 
with minority enrollment of 20% or less. 
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withdrawal of judicial oversight, based on the relaxed standards of Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins, has had a negative impact both on the elimination of 
discriminatory effects and on the prevention of such harmful effects in the 
future.79 Such impact is due, in part, to local officials’ reliance on the 
“neighborhood school concept” when making student assignment decisions.  As 
demonstrated in the following section, employing student assignment methods 
that are based on racially segregated neighborhoods produces resegregation in 
public education and the detrimental effects that accompany such environments. 
 
B. The Neighborhood School Dilemma 
 
Historically, the neighborhood school concept, which calls for the 
assignment of students to schools that are in close proximity to their homes, has 
been a preferred method for making school assignment decisions.80 Many argue 
that adherence to neighborhood schools provide educational benefits ranging 
from increased parental and community involvement that results in improved 
student achievement81 to reductions in transportation costs, which provide 
 
See also Holley, supra note 25, at 1095-1096 & n.60 (noting that thirty-four of the thirty-eight 
school districts that have achieved unitary status since the Dowell decision have experienced 
resegregation as measured by “a decrease in the exposure of black students to white students, and 
the exposure of Latino students to white students”).    
79 See Orfield & Lee, supra note 30, at 18 (attributing the resegregation trend “to the impact of 
three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995 limiting school desegregation and 
authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools”). 
80 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[a]ll things being 
equal…it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes”); see also Levit, 
supra note 38, at 456 & n.6 (referring to state initiatives to pass and implement “Neighborhood 
Schools Acts”).  Student assignments based on proximity to one’s home are especially favored 
when compared to the alternative of busing. See Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in 
the Post-Brown South: Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 746-747 
(2004) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Robert Scott as stating, ‘The neighborhood-
school concept has been the strength of our public education system in North Carolina and our state 
has been committed to that policy for some time. It is sound educational policy and must be 
preserved.’) (citation omitted); Id. at 747 (quoting former President Richard Nixon as describing 
neighborhood schools as ‘the most appropriate…system’) (citation omitted); Levit, supra note 38, 
at 456 & n.5 (referring to Congressional anti-busing legislation setting forth the government’s 
official policy that “students attend neighborhood schools”). 
81 See Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to Neighborhood 
Schools, Concentrated Poverty, and Educational Opportunity: An Agenda for Reform, 28 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739, 743 (2001). 
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additional funding for teacher salaries and educational programs.82 These 
benefits, however, are greatly outweighed by the detrimental effects that 
accompany many neighborhood school decisions:  namely, the resegregation of 
elementary and secondary schools and the overwhelming challenges that are 
present in such environments. 
Following the termination of desegregation decrees and the return of 
educational decisions to local control, many school districts returned to the 
neighborhood school concept when making their student assignment decisions.83 
Considering the rate of residential segregation in communities throughout the 
country, it is not surprising that such decisions have resulted in the resegregation 
of public schools.84 ‘One-third of all African Americans in the United States live 
under conditions of intense racial segregation.’85 In 2000, over 230 American 
urban communities could be described as ‘hypersegregated’ or ‘partially 
segregated.’86 Therefore, in accordance with student assignment policies that 
assign students to schools based on neighborhood proximity, schools populated 
 
82 See Kenneth O'Neil Salyer, Beyond Zelman: Reinventing Neighborhood Schools, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 283, 287-288 (2004) (discussing the advantages of neighborhood schools).  Other proffered 
advantages of neighborhood schools include the following: reduction in student-teacher ratios, 
reduction in travel safety hazards, creation of sense of community, and simplification of student 
assignment policies. Id. See also Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De 
Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).  
83 See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of 
the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1342 (2004) (noting school districts’ reversion to 
“neighborhood schools placed in segregated neighborhoods”); Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal 
Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement,
24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 294, 322-323 (2006) (discussing the impact of termination of desegregation 
decrees and reinstitution of neighborhood schools on the resegregation of Minneapolis schools); 
Speech by Theodore M. Shaw: “From Brown to Grutter: The Legal Struggle for Racial Equality,
16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 43, 52 (2004) (recounting of incident in which the Norfolk Virginia 
School District expressed “its intention to return to neighborhood schools by abandoning its 
desegregation plan after a declaration of unitary status”). 
84 See Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of Integration,
22 J.L. & POL. 49, 69 (2006) (noting that school segregation follows housing segregation); Ware, 
supra note 17, at 56 (attributing the failure of desegregation efforts in many urban schools to 
pervasive segregated housing patterns).  
85 See Ware, supra note 17, at 65 (citing Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74-78 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1994)). 
86 See Boger, supra note 78, at 1402 & n.97 (detailing residential segregation levels in 
metropolitan areas).  
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by students living in these areas will also experience high levels of racial 
segregation,87 which often brings about adverse educational consequences. 
Research shows that students attending racially segregated schools, 
which are often economically segregated as well,88 encounter tremendous 
challenges that greatly hinder their educational achievement.  Students attending 
schools with majority minority student populations are often educated in 
‘substandard and deteriorating facilities.’89 Their learning environments often 
suffer from “shortages of library books, computers, or laboratory equipment.”90 
The teachers who educate them are often less qualified than those teaching at 
racially and economically diverse schools.91 This lack of resources leads to 
disparities in minority students’ academic achievement as measured by 
 
87 See id. at 1400 (predicting that “residential segregation will prove especially likely to lead to 
school resegregation if districts choose student assignment strategies based on neighborhood 
schools”); id. at 1407-1408 (discussing racial segregation increases in North Carolina schools 
following the implementation of neighborhood schools assignment plans); Gary Orfield & 
Chungmei Lee, Racial Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation, Harvard Civil 
Rights Project 9 (2006) available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf (noting that 
“[s]ince the Supreme Court authorized a return to segregated neighborhood schools. . ., the 
percentage of black students attending majority nonwhite schools increased in all regions from 66 
percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 2003-4). 
88 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
89 See Levit, supra note 38, at 497 (citing Leland Ware, Redlining Learners: Delaware’s 
Neighborhood Schools Act, 20 DEL. LAW. 14, 16 (2002)).  
90 Boger, supra note 78, at 1382.  
91 See id.; Levit, supra note 38, at 498; supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.  
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standardized tests scores,92 high school drop out and graduation rates,93 college 
matriculation rates,94 and post-graduate degrees.95 
Not only are students attending segregated schools forced to overcome 
educational resources deficiencies, but they are also deprived of the educational 
benefits related to interacting with students who possess higher educational 
aspirations.  Unfortunately, many minority students who live in lower-income, 
racially segregated neighborhoods and attend lower-performing schools within 
those neighborhoods have low expectations regarding academic achievement.  In 
fact, some minority communities suffer from a culture that devalues academic 
success,96 which significantly undermines minority students’ academic 
expectations and aspirations.  As noted by scholar John Charles Boger: 
A pupil’s achievement is strongly related to the educational 
backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the 
school….Thus…if a minority pupil from a home without much 
educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong 
educational backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase.97 
If, in fact, “the social characteristics of a school’s student body [are] the single 
most important school-related factor in predicting minority student 
achievement,”98 student assignment plans that rely on poor, racially segregated 
 
92 See Curt A. Levey, Racial Preferences in Admissions: Myths, Harms, and Alternatives, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 489, 502 (2003) (discussing racial disparities in minority and nonminority students’ 
standardized test scores); Keith R. Walsh, Color-blind Racism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 443, 449-51 (2004) (discussing disparities between Blacks and Whites 
regarding their performance on standardized tests). 
93 In 2004, the high school drop out rate for African-American students age 16-24 was 11.8% 
compared to 6.8% for their white counterparts.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY (2006), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=481.  In 2005, fewer Blacks than 
Whites age 25 - 29 years old had completed high school (87% vs. 93%). See NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-1 
(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=492. 
94 In 2005, only 49.0% of African-Americans between the ages of 25-29 had completed at 
least some college as compared to 64.3% of Whites. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-2 (2006), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=493; see also A. Mechele 
Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1769-1770 (2004).  
95 In 2005, 34.1% of Whites between the ages of 25-29 had obtained a bachelor’s degree or 
higher while only 17.5% of Blacks had achieved the same educational success.  See NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TBL. 31-3 
(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tableID=494.   
96 See Nelson, supra note 26, at 26 & n.127. 
97 Boger, supra note 78, at 1415 (citing James S. Coleman et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 22 (1966)). 
98 Id.
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neighborhoods will only exacerbate the current disparities existing between 
minority and non-minority student achievement. 
Considering the detrimental impact the creation of neighborhood schools 
has on desegregation efforts and, consequently, the quality of education received 
by many minority students, one wonders why school boards continue to advocate 
for and create them.  While school boards’ decisions to adhere to neighborhood 
schools may be attributable, in part, to their purported benefits,99 parents’ vocal 
opposition to busing and school boundary proposals has also greatly influenced 
school boards’ actions. Due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of school 
boards are elected positions,100 their members must confront political pressures 
that are brought to bear upon them by their constituents. Having particular 
influence on school board members are those voting parents who organize in 
efforts to oppose school boundary and student assignment proposals that attempt 
to diversify schools, both in terms of race and socioeconomic status.101 
The school board members elected to govern the Humble Independent 
School District in Humble, Texas faced similar opposition in 2003 after 
announcing their proposals to redraw school boundaries.102 Because some of the 
 
99 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.  
100 See Frederick M. Hess, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (2002) 
(reporting that in a survey of 2000 school boards, 93% were entirely elected), available at 
http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/1200/1143.pdf.  
101 While parent groups comprise 52.1% of constituent groups that are “active” in school 
board elections, ethnic or racial groups only comprise 18.1%. See id. at 37. See also Boger, supra 
note 78, at 1399-1400 (discussing parents’ resistance efforts to the proposal of assigning poor, low-
performing students to schools where their children attended and to the reassignment of white, 
middle-class students to lower income, lower performing schools); Dana Banker, Plantation 
Parents Join Busing Debate School Boundaries Face Challenge at Meeting, SOUTH FL. SUN-
SENTINEL, March 27, 1995, at 1B, available in 1995 WLNR 4830234 (stating the goal of parents 
who oppose school boundary proposals that would require their children to be bused to a 
predominantly Black school to “[m]ake board members realize that this Plantation [parent] 
contingent is a sizable group with which to be reckoned”);  John Hill, Good schools for all 
Hillsborough, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 12A, available in 2006 WLNR 8296371 
(stating that “[p]arents of upscale Westchase scolded, taunted and threatened the elected board with 
political retaliation” because of their discontentment regarding the school board’s student 
reassignment proposal); Ginger Jenkins, Boundary Committee endures wrath of Fall Creek 
residents, April 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.hcnonline.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=11289350&BRD=1574&PAG=461&dept_id=5
32207&rfi=8&xb=lutex (discussing parents’ vocal opposition to school boundary proposals that 
would zone their children to Title 1 schools, which have high economically-disadvantaged student 
populations); Scott Travis, Parents Protest Plan to Alter School Boundary, SOUTH FL. SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2000, at 1B, available in 2000 WLNR 8568161 (discussing parents’ opposition 
to a school boundary proposal that would add 163 predominantly poor, African-American students 
to their children’s elementary school). 
102 See Cindy Horswell, School boundaries draw parents’ wrath/Humble ISD stirs campus 
controversy, HOUS. CHRON., November 15, 2003, at A31, available in 2003 WLNR 16389739. 
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boundary proposals called for certain middle-upper class, predominantly white 
neighborhoods to be zoned to schools that would have predominantly minority, 
lower income student populations, parents and residents residing in the 
predominantly white neighborhoods voiced their dissent and lobbied school 
board members to vote to keep their children at the “good” schools.103 Although 
the decision was not unanimous, the school board acquiesced and voted to accept 
boundary proposals that would allow the parents’ children to attend the more 
desirable schools.104 Unfortunately, the same boundary decision also created 
racially and economically segregated schools due to the extraction of white, 
middle-class students.105 
If school board members continue to employ student assignment policies 
that rely on racially segregated housing patterns and to yield to political parental 
pressures that oppose diversification and, thereby, desegregation efforts, then the 
goal of attaining educational equality for minority students will be unrealized.  In 
attempts to avoid the harmful costs associated with resegregation, some school 
districts have voluntarily implemented plans that consider students’ race when 
making student assignment decisions.  The next section examines two such plans 
and their attempts to further compelling interests via constitutional means.                 
II. TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT 
ASSIGNMENT PLANS 
Due to the resegregation trend that is currently plaguing American public 
educational institutions, school districts have begun to experiment with various 
measures intended to diversify elementary and secondary schools.  School 
districts have implemented school choice programs whereby parents can decide 
 
103 See Linda Gilchriest, Tough Choices/Humble ISD must decide controversial lines issues,
Hous. Chron., July 10, 2003, at 1, available in 2003 WLNR 16369914 (discussing Fall Creek’s 
(“an upscale subdivision with million-dollar homes”) opposition to being zoned to Humble High 
School “because it would have a greater number of minority and economically disadvantaged 
students”); see also Jenkins, supra note 101. 
104 See Kristen Wright, Humble ISD adopts new boundaries/New Kingwood Park to be scaled 
down, Hous. Chron., Sept. 2, 2004, at 1, available in 2004 WLNR 20930185. 
105 Following adoption of the new boundaries, Humble High School was projected to be 45%-
65% minority and 45%-55% economically disadvantaged. Meanwhile, more affluent Kingwood 
High School was projected to have a student body that was only 10%-20% minority and 5-15% 
economically disadvantaged. The newly created high school (to which parents lobbied school board 
members to have their children attend) was projected to be 30%-50% minority and only 15%-25% 
economically disadvantaged. See DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS CORE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION 
(on file with author). 
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which schools they would like for their child to attend.106 To encourage parents 
to choose schools that may have high populations of minority, economically-
disadvantaged students, many school districts have introduced programs that 
provide pre-college courses of study such as the International Baccalaureate (IB) 
Diploma Program at such schools.107 School districts have also created magnet 
schools and programs, which have a particular theme or curricular focus, such as 
science, technology, mathematics or performing arts, in their efforts to achieve 
diverse student bodies.108 
Schools have also taken a more direct approach to achieve their diversity 
goals by considering students’ race and ethnicity when making student 
assignment decisions.  Such consideration has subjected school districts to 
intense and, in some cases, fatal judicial scrutiny.109 The school districts in the 
following two cases, however, successfully overcame the constitutional 
challenges launched against their race-conscious student assignment plans at the 
circuit court level.  It remains to be seen whether the same will be true following 
the Supreme Court’s consideration of the plans.  
A. McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of Education 
 
106 See Robert A. Frahm, Court Takes On Race Case School Desegregation Could Be Affected,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2006, at A1, available in 2006 WLNR 9686740 (discussing 
Connecticut’s use of school choice to promote racial diversity in elementary and secondary 
education) 
107 In 2006, the Humble Independent School District in Humble, TX announced its plans to 
institute the IB Diploma Program at Humble High School, which is the most racially diverse and 
economically-disadvantaged high school in the district.  See What in the World is IB?, available at 
http://www.humble.k12.tx.us/ibpage.htm.  During the 2004-2005 school year, 25.4% of Humble 
High School’s student population was economically disadvantaged, compared to only 3.3% at 
Kingwood High School.  The minority enrollment at Humble High School is also significantly 
greater than that at Kingwood High School (50.6% vs. 14%). See 2004-2005 ACADEMIC 
EXCELLENCE INDICATOR SYSTEM CAMPUS REPORTS, available at 
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2005/campus.srch.html.   
108 See Hill, supra note 101 (discussing a school district’s implementation of school choice as 
a means to “maintain integrated schools by making them more attractive to residents outside their 
neighborhoods”); Harold A. McDougall, Brown at Sixty: The Case for Black Reparations, 47 HOW.
L.J. 863, 892 (2004) (discussing the goal of magnet schools “to accomplish or maintain 
desegregation”). 
109 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(invalidating a race-conscious student transfer plan that denied students’ transfer requests if they 
would have an adverse impact on the assigned or requested school’s diversity levels); Tuttle v. 
Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating an assignment plan that 
based admission into an alternative kindergarten in part on students’ race and ethnicity); Wessman 
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (invalidating Boston Latin School’s race-conscious 
admissions policy).  
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In its attempts to maintain an integrated school system following the 
lifting of a desegregation decree, the Jefferson County Public Schools (the 
“Board”) implemented a student assignment plan that includes racial 
guidelines.110 While students have the ability to choose which school they would 
like to attend, their ultimate assignment can be affected by the operation of the 
racial guidelines, which require African-American student enrollment to be “at 
least 15% and no more than 50%” of the student body.111 Although many other 
non-racial factors affect student assignment, the racial guidelines prohibit some 
students’ admission into particular schools or academic programs based on their 
race.112 Because of such effect, students and parents challenged the 
constitutionality of the Board’s race-conscious student assignment plan. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of the plan, the District Court applied 
strict scrutiny, which requires the Board to demonstrate that its use of race 
furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so using narrowly tailored 
means.113 In formulating what appears to be a novel justification for the use of 
race in education, the Court held that the maintenance of racially integrated 
elementary and secondary schools constitutes a compelling interest.114 In 
assessing the Board’s asserted interests,115 the Court found that the educational 
and societal benefits that are derived from racial diversity in higher education are 
also produced in the context of elementary and secondary education.116 The 
Court accepted the Board’s argument that “school integration benefits the system 
as a whole by creating a system of roughly equal components…not one rich and 
another poor, not one Black and another White.”117 Finally, in holding that the 
Board’s interests are compelling, the Court held that the Board was not engaged 
in unconstitutional “racial balancing” because of its demonstrated commitment to 
 
110 See McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 836. 
111 Id. at 842. 
112 See id.
113 See id. at 837, 848-849. 
114 See id. at 855. 
115 The Court’s statement of the Board’s asserted interests is as follows:  
To give all students the benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to 
maintain community commitment to the entire school system precisely express the 
Board's own vision of Brown 's promise. The benefits the JCPS hopes to achieve go to the 
heart of its educational mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2) better 
appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; (3) more competitive 
and attractive public schools; and (4) broader community support for all JCPS schools. 
Id. at 850 & n.29. 
116 See id. at 853. 
117 Id. at 854. 
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integration and educational equality and the “academic, social and institutional 
benefits [they] achieve[ ].”118 
Not only did the District Court find that the Board used race in its pursuit 
of compelling interests, but it also concluded that, in most respects, it utilized 
narrowly tailored means to pursue such interests.119 The Court applied the 
following four criteria in determining the constitutionality of the race-conscious 
student assignment plan:  
(1) whether the 2001 Plan amounts to a quota that seeks a fixed 
number of desirable minority students and insulates one group of 
applicants from another, (2) whether the applicant is afforded 
individualized review, (3) whether the 2001 Plan "unduly 
harm[s] members of any racial group,"  and (4) whether JCPS 
has given "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives" to achieve its goals.120 
In finding that the racial guidelines did not operate as a quota, the District Court 
reasoned that they represented a “quite flexible and broad target range,” such as 
that permitted in Grutter, and not a “relatively precise target.”121 This reasoning, 
however, fails to address the fact that the “target range” is actually a Board 
requirement that African-American students comprise 15%-50%  of a school’s 
student enrollment.122 The Board’s formulation of its diversity goal as a 
numerical mandate may prove to be fatal in its quest to seek constitutional 
approval from the Supreme Court.123 
Related to the quota criteria is the narrowly tailored requirement that 
race-conscious student assignment plans afford each student holistic, 
individualized review.  Unlike other courts that have held that the requirement is 
inapplicable in the context of elementary and secondary education,124 the District 
 
118 Id. at 855. 
119 See id. at 855-862. 
120 Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted). 
121 Id. at 857. The Court also relied on the varying actual percentages of Black students present 
at individual schools (20.1%-50.4%) to support its conclusion that the guidelines did not operate as 
a quota. See id.
122 See id. at 842 (stating that “the 2001 Plan requires each school to seek a Black student 
enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 50%) (emphasis added). 
123 For further discussion, see infra Part III.  
124 See, e.g., Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183 (concluding “that if a noncompetitive, voluntary 
student assignment plan is otherwise narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in 
a individualized, holistic manner”); Comfort, 418 F.3d at 18 (“Unlike the Gratz and Grutter 
policies, the Lynn Plan is designed to achieve racial diversity rather than viewpoint diversity.  The 
only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race; individualized consideration beyond that is 
irrelevant to the compelling interest.) (footnote omitted). 
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Court considered the requirement and found that the Board’s plan allows for 
individualized review, albeit “of a different kind in a different context than the 
Supreme Court found in Grutter.”125 The Court reasoned that the Board 
considers many aspects of each student’s application when determining student 
assignments.  “[R]ace is simply one possible factor among many, acting only 
occasionally as a permissible “tipping” factor in most of the [Board] assignment 
process.”126 Because the Board successfully demonstrated that its plan complied 
with this as well as the other narrowly tailored requirements, the Court concluded 
that its use of race in student assignments was constitutionally permissible.127
B. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
 
Employing similar rationale as that utilized by the Board in McFarland,
the Seattle School District Number 1 (the “District”) also adopted an open choice 
student assignment plan in its attempts to create racially diverse schools and to 
prevent racial imbalance that would result from adherence to the neighborhood 
school concept. The plan allows parents to choose which of the ten high schools 
they want their children to attend, provided a particular school has availability.128 
To address situations in which a school is oversubscribed,129 the District employs 
four tiebreakers, the second one being a student’s race.130 Although the District 
has never engaged in de jure segregation and, therefore, has never been ordered 
to desegregate,131 as had the McFarland Board, it voluntary uses the racial 
tiebreaker to ensure diversity or “balance” in the racial composition of its public 
high schools.132 The operation of the racial tiebreaker is as follows:  If a school’s 
student population deviates from the goal of 40% white and 60% minority (+/-
15%), then the racial tiebreaker is used to grant automatic admission to those 
students whose race will enable the school to move closer to the desired racial 
 
125 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 859. 
126 Id.
127 The Court did conclude, however, that with regards to the traditional school assignments in 
which African-American and white students are placed on separate assignment tracks, the narrowly 
tailored requirement was not met; therefore, the Board’s use of race was constitutionally 
impermissible. See id. at 862-864.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment 
without issuing a detailed written opinion. See McFarland, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).  
128 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 954-955, (9th 
Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Parents I], rev’d Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
129 A school is considered to be “oversubscribed” “when more students want to attend that 
school than there are spaces available.” See id. at 955. 
130 See id.
131 See id. at 954. 
132 See id. at 955. 
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composition.133 Conversely, the racial tiebreaker also operates to deny admission 
to those students whose race does not further the District’s diversity goals.134 
Because the District, a state actor, utilizes student assignment policies that are 
based in part on race, such policies are subject to strict scrutiny and, thus, must 
employ ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests.’135 
In Parents I, the Ninth Circuit found that the racial tiebreaker program 
did not pass constitutional scrutiny.  While the Court recognized the pursuit of 
educational and societal benefits that accompany racially diverse learning 
environments as a compelling interest,136 it found that the racial tiebreaker was 
not narrowly tailored to further such interest.137 Upon rehearing en banc, the 
Ninth Circuit sanctioned the use of the racial tiebreaker and found that the 
measure was narrowly tailored to further the District’s compelling interest in 
achieving racially and ethnically diverse student bodies.138 Similar to the District 
Court in McFarland, the Court also recognized another compelling interest - 
“ameliorating racial isolation or concentration in . . . high schools by ensuring . . . 
[student] assignments do not simply replicate . . . segregated housing patterns.”139 
Both Courts in Parents I and Parents II agreed that “one compelling 
reason for considering race is to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”140 
Both Courts found that the District’s educational goals complied with the 
constitutionally permissible diversity rationale as set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Grutter.141 In so doing, the Court in Parents I alluded to the prevention of 
 
133 See id. at 955-956. 
134 See id. at n.7. 
135 Id. at 960 (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270). Cf, Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review “because the Seattle plan carries none 
of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict 
scrutiny and narrow tailoring”).  
136 See id. at 964. 
137 See id. at 969. 
138 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1166. 
139 Id; see also James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 327, 334 (2006) (formulating the constitutional issue related to voluntary race-conscious 
student assignment plans as “whether [public schools] have a compelling interest in creating or 
maintaining a racially integrated student body”). 
140 Id. at 1173; see also Parents I, 377 F.3d at 964. 
141 See id. at 962 (discussing the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the diversity rationale in 
Grutter); id. at 964 (concluding that “each of the School District’s proffered interests in using its 
racial tiebreaker falls comfortably within the diversity rationale as . . . articulated to (and embraced 
by) the Court”); see also Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (describing Grutter’s compelling interest as 
“the promotion of the specific educational and societal benefits that flow from diversity”).  
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racial isolation as a permissible goal,142 while Parents II directly held that 
“ameliorating real, identifiable de facto racial segregation” is a separate 
compelling interest.143 
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized the elimination of de 
facto racial segregation as a compelling interest,144 other lower courts have.145 In 
advocating for a new compelling interest for using race in an education context, 
the Ninth Circuit employs the following reasoning:  
The benefits that flow from integration (or desegregation) exist 
whether or not a state actor was responsible for the earlier racial 
isolation. Brown’s statement that “in the field of public education 
... [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” retains 
its validity today. The District is entitled to seek the benefits of 
racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the 
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. 
Constitution.146
The Court also relies on the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence 
to justify its sanctioning of school districts’ voluntary race-conscious integration 
efforts.147 
Unlike the three-judge panel in Parents I, the Parents II Court held that 
the race-conscious student assignment plan used by the District was narrowly 
tailored to achieve its compelling interests.  The contrary holdings may be due, in 
part, to the differing narrowly tailored tests utilized by the Courts.  Parents I 
identified and applied the following six narrowly tailoring requirements:  (1) 
prohibition of racial quotas; (2) flexible, individualized consideration of each 
applicant; (3) prohibition of mechanical or conclusive consideration of race; (4) 
earnest consideration of race-neutral alternatives; (5) minimization of adverse 
impact on non-preferred group members; and (6) time limitation.148 Parents II,
however, identified the following five factors and only applied factors two 
through five: “(1) individualized consideration of applicants; (2) the absence of 
quotas; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the 
affirmative action program; (4) that no member of any racial group was unduly 
 
142 See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 963. 
143 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1178-1179. 
144 See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 (“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.  
It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
145 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1178 (citing district and appellate court decisions holding that 
the creation and maintenance of desegregated schools serve compelling governmental interests). 
146 Id. at 1179 (citation omitted). 
147 See id.
148 See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 968-969. 
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harmed; and (5) that the program had a sunset provision or some other end 
point.”149 
In finding the individualized consideration factor inapplicable to the 
District’s plan, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the different contexts of higher 
education admissions and secondary education assignments.150 The Court argued 
that the protections afforded by individualized consideration in a competitive 
university admission context are not relevant in a non-competitive student 
assignment context.151 The Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz employed the 
requirement “in order to prevent race from being used as a mechanical proxy for 
an applicant’s qualifications.”152 As asserted by the Ninth Circuit, the 
requirement is unnecessary in the present case because students’ qualifications 
are unrelated to their assignment to a particular school.  If students’ 
qualifications, such as performance on standardized tests, grades, and artistic and 
athletic abilities, are not factors in student assignment decisions, then a holistic, 
individualized review or consideration of such factors is not necessary.153 
The Court also argued that the differences in compelling interests 
advanced by universities and elementary and secondary schools warrant the non-
application of individualized review.  While the use of race in both contexts 
seeks to obtain the social and educational benefits of diversity, the university 
context lacks the second compelling interest that is present in the high school 
context, which is preventing the replication of segregated housing patterns in 
public education.154 “Because race itself is the relevant consideration when 
attempting to ameliorate de facto segregation, the District’s tiebreaker must 
necessarily focus on the race of its students.”155 In the Court’s opinion, to require 
school districts to focus on attributes other than race, such as leadership potential, 
grades, or life experiences, would undermine their ability to achieve and maintain 
racially integrated schools.  
 
149 Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1180. 
150 See Ryan, supra note 139, at 335-336, 339 (arguing that the narrow tailoring test must be 
formulated in light of the context in which race is used).   
151 See id. at 1180-1181; see also Ryan, supra note 139, at 335-336, 339-344 (arguing that 
given the different context of employing non-merit based, non-competitive race-conscious 
assignment plans, public schools should not be required to give individidualized consideration to 
each student). 
152 Id. at 1181. 
153 See id; see also Holmes, supra note 63, at 595-596 (asserting similar arguments regarding 
the inapplicability of Grutter’s individualized consideration requirement to “non-merit-based race-
conscious student assignment” programs). 
154 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183. 
155 Id.
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The Court in Parents I did not appear to address the different contexts of 
higher and secondary education as they relate to the individualized consideration 
requirement.  They merely recognized the requirement as a narrow tailored factor 
and applied it to the present case.  In so doing, the Court found that instead of 
considering several different factors to determine student assignment (as 
constitutionally mandated in Grutter and Gratz), the racial tiebreaker 
“automatically and mechanically admits…[and denies] hundreds of white and 
non-white applicants solely because of their race.”156 The Court concluded that 
such operation fails the narrow tailored test as set forth in Grutter by establishing 
a ‘de jure [policy] of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[ ] single ‘soft’ 
variable.’157 As demonstrated by the conflicting holdings in Parents I and 
Parents II, the Supreme Court’s formulation of the compelling interests (if any) 
and the narrowly tailored requirements to advance such interests will have a 
significant impact on its findings regarding the constitutionality of voluntary 
race-conscious student assignment plans.       
 
III. A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE COURT’S CRYSTAL BALL:
THE BLEAK FUTURE FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS 
When one considers the importance of the issues raised in Parents 
Involved and Meredith and their potential impact on the provision of educational 
opportunities to minority students, it is clear that the decisions will significantly 
contribute to the jurisprudence concerning public education in this country.  In 
determining the constitutionality of race-conscious student assignment plans, the 
Supreme Court will either sanction or prohibit school districts’ use of race as a 
means to create and maintain racially diverse learning environments.  
Unfortunately, the Court’s reasoning and holdings in previous cases involving 
the use of race in education present difficult and, in all likelihood, 
insurmountable challenges to the sanctioning of voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment plans as employed in the cases at bar.   
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment plans, the Supreme Court must first determine whether the plans 
serve a compelling interest.158 Although the Court has never provided a precise 
 
156 Parents I, 377 F.3d at 970 (emphasis added). 
157 Id.
158 According to the Supreme Court’s holding in Adarand, all government imposed racial 
classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."  See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  Therefore, the school districts’ race-
conscious student assignment plans “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.” Id. For a contrary view regarding the appropriate 
standard of review, see Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a 
rational basis standard of review “because the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme 
Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring”).  
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definition of what constitutes a “compelling interest,”159 the term is generally 
assumed to refer to those interests that are ‘of the highest order,’ ‘overriding,’ or 
‘unusually important.’160 To date, the Supreme Court has recognized two 
compelling interests that justify the government’s constitutional use of race: (1) 
to remedy past discrimination161 and (2) to achieve student body diversity in 
higher education.162 The school districts in Meredith and Parents Involved ask 
the Court to recognize a third – to achieve and maintain racially integrated 
elementary and secondary schools.163 Considering the Court’s prior discussions 
and holdings regarding government’s remedial authority in the context of de 
facto segregation and its prohibition against racial balancing, it is unlikely that it 
will “expand[ ] the range of permissible uses of race”164 to include the creation 
and maintenance of racially diverse public schools.  Even if the school districts 
succeed in demonstrating a compelling interest, the Court will likely prohibit 
their continued use of race under the challenged plans due to their failure to meet 
narrowly tailored requirements. 
 
A. De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation 
 
Directly addressing the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race to 
remedy de facto segregation in public education will be a case of first impression 
for the Court.165 The Court, however, has had previous opportunities to consider 
the use of race to remedy de jure segregation in the educational context.166 In its 
desegregation jurisprudence, the Court has permitted school districts to employ 
race-conscious measures in their attempts to eliminate unconstitutional dual 
 
159 See Thomas R. Bender, Does the Right to Trial by Jury Place Constitutional Limits on 
Prejudgment Interest?, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 935, 950-951 (2006). 
160 Id; see also McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 850 (stating that “[w]hether an asserted interest 
is truly compelling is revealed only by assessing the objective validity of the goal, its importance to 
[the government actor] and the sincerity of [the government actor’s] interest”). 
161 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
162 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.  
163 See Brief in Opposition at 11-13, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 
448513; Brief in Opposition at 16, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 
789611. 
164 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (noting that “the Supreme Court has never decided a case 
involving the consideration of race in a voluntarily imposed school assignment plan intended to 
promote racially and ethnically diverse secondary schools”). 
166 See, Swann, 402 U.S. 1; United States v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 365 U.S. 225 
(1969). 
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educational systems.167 The measures, however, were restricted to circumstances 
in which schools’ student bodies and faculties were racially imbalanced as a 
result of the districts’ intentional discrimination.  Such circumstances do not exist 
in Parents Involved and Meredith.
As previously discussed, the District in Parents Involved has never 
experienced legal segregation and, therefore, has never been subject to a 
desegregation decree.168 The District’s use of race does not seek to remedy the 
effects of intentional discrimination but rather to prevent racial imbalance that 
would result from student assignments based on racially segregated housing 
patterns.  The same is true for the Board’s utilization of race in McFarland.
Although the Board had previously been subject to a desegregation 
decree, the decree was dissolved in June 2000, ten months prior to the Board’s 
adoption of the race-conscious student assignment plan.169 To justify the 
dissolution of the decree, the District Court found that “[t]o the greatest extent 
practicable, the Decree has eliminated the vestiges associated with the former 
policy of segregation and its pernicious effects.”170 Therefore, arguably, the 
Board’s use of racial guidelines is not necessary to eliminate vestiges of racial 
discrimination since such effects have been deemed to already have been 
eliminated.  Instead, the Board utilizes the racial guidelines to maintain the 
racially integrated schools created under the desegregation decree. 
As noted by the District Court responsible for lifting the decree in 
McFarland, student assignment racial guidelines and ratios “were shielded from 
normal constitutional scrutiny” if employed under a federally mandated 
desegregation order.171 Due to school districts’ blatant disregard for the Supreme 
Court’s mandate to desegregate, there existed an urgent need for courts to take an 
active role in directing desegregation efforts.172 Within this role, courts issued 
various desegregation mandates, and school districts implemented various 
policies and programs in their efforts to comply with such mandates.  Even 
though “voluntary school integration” may be viewed “as an extension of the 
 
167 See id. at 235-236 (sanctioning the establishment of racial ratios for school faculties as a 
desegregation measure); see also, Swann, 402 U.S. at 25 (permitting the use of racial mathematical 
ratios to ensure student body diversity).  
168 See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 954. 
169 See McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 841. 
170 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F.Supp.2d 358, 360 (W.D.Ky. 2000) 
[hereinafter Hampton II]. 
171 Id. at 376; see also Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F.Supp.2d 753, 777 
(W.D.Ky. 1999) [hereinafter Hampton I] (“When the Board acts pursuant to the continuing Decree, 
it acts lawfully.”). 
172 See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (acknowledging school districts’ delay in complying with 
Brown I and Brown II desegregation mandates); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing district 
courts to enter desegregation decrees to require schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). 
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Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence,”173 it does not necessarily 
follow that policies implemented under the legal protection of a desegregation 
decree will survive constitutional scrutiny once the order has been lifted.174 
As argued in Parents Involved and Meredith, the context in which state 
actors use race and ethnicity is extremely important when determining the 
constitutionality of their usage.175 Just as the benefits attained by using race in 
elementary and secondary education may differ from those attained from using 
race in higher education, the necessity of racial considerations in federally 
mandated student assignment plans may differ from the necessity of such 
considerations in voluntary plans.  In Jenkins, the Supreme Court clarified that its 
pronouncement in Brown I “was tied purely to de jure segregation, not de facto 
segregation.”176 Because states had intentionally required Blacks to attend 
separate, inferior schools, states had an affirmative duty to implement those 
measures that would effectively eliminate dual educational systems.177 The 
Court found that measures involving racial guidelines and ratios were necessary 
to remedy the harms caused by de jure segregation.178 Once states had 
practically eliminated the harms associated with de jure segregation, the Court 
held that desegregation duties had been fulfilled since “mere de facto segregation 
(unaccompanied by discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not 
constitute a continuing harm after the end of de jure segregation.179 In Freeman,
the Court further clarified that with regards to its jurisprudence concerning the 
imposition of “‘awkward,’ ‘inconvenient, and ‘even bizarre’ measures to achieve 
racial balance in student assignment,” such measures were reserved to the context 
 
173 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 851; see also Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1179 (concluding that 
the Supreme Court’s reference to “the voluntary integration of schools as sound educational policy 
within the discretion of local school officials” supports the Court’s finding that “[t]he District is 
entitled to seek the benefits of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the 
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constitution”) (emphasis in original). 
174 See, e.g., Hampton II, 102 F.Supp.2d at 381 (holding that the Board’s race-conscious 
magnet school student assignment plan that had previously been permissible under the 
desegregation decree was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest). 
175 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (stating that ‘[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based 
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause’) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326); 
McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 849-850 (reasoning that “[t]he different context ‘matters’ because, 
under the Equal Protection Clause, ‘[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable…’”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327). 
176 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added). 
177 See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-438. 
178 See supra note 162. 
179 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122. 
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of de jure segregation, not phases “when the imbalance is attributable…to 
independent demographic forces.”180 
The current Supreme Court may rely on this rationale to find that the 
elimination of racial isolation attributable to de facto segregation in public 
schools does not justify the use of racial guidelines and tiebreakers in voluntary 
student assignment plans.  In its reluctance to expand the justifications for the 
voluntary use of racial classifications, the Court may confine such race-based 
measures to the context of de jure segregation, which, as previously discussed, is 
inapplicable in the present cases.181 
B. Racial Balancing 
 
Despite the various contexts in which race and ethnicity have been 
employed to achieve governmental interests, the Supreme Court has routinely 
rejected voluntary racial balancing as a permissible interest to justify their 
usage.182 In rejecting racial balancing “for its own sake,” the Court in Freeman 
limited its pursuit to those circumstances in which “racial imbalance has been 
caused by a constitutional violation.”183 Considering the arguments advanced by 
the petitioners in Parents Involved and Meredith,184 it is apparent that both school 
districts will have to overcome the Court’s prohibition against racial balancing to 
sustain their utilization of race-conscious student assignment plans. 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between racial 
balancing and the pursuit of a “critical mass” of minority students.  According to 
the court, a school’s attempt ‘to assure within [a] student body some specified 
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin’ 
 
180 See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493 
181 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1208, n.17 (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s desegregation jurisprudence sanctions the use of race to “to combat past de jure 
segregation” not “to achieve racial balance absent de jure segregation”). 
182 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-330 (holding that “outright racial balancing…is patently 
unconstitutional”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-307 (rejecting racial balancing as facially invalid). 
183 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494. 
184 For example, one of the questions presented by the petitioner in Parents Involved asks the 
following:  
May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a 
student to attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to her 
chosen school solely because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial 
balance in particular schools, or does such racial balancing violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?  
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 
1579631 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-
915), 2006 WL 2433475 (arguing that the Board’s imposition of racial guidelines “is simply an 
action for the sake of reflecting racial distribution”). 
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amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing.185 If, however, a school defines its 
diversity pursuits “by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce,” then such pursuits may be constitutionally permissible.186
The respondents in Parents Involved and Meredith argue that their race-
conscious plans have met this test. 
The respondents in Parents Involved argue that the District’s plan, 
including the integration tiebreaker, does not amount to racial balancing because 
it does “not seek to achieve a pre-determined racial distribution in any school,” as 
proscribed by the Constitution.187 Rather, the plan seeks to afford white and 
minority students the opportunity to attend popular schools that may not be close 
to their neighborhoods.188 Similarly, the respondents in Meredith also argue that 
their use of racial guidelines in student assignments is not motivated by 
constitutionally impermissible interests.189 Rather, the guidelines are used to 
promote the Board’s good faith interest in maintaining racial integration in its 
schools and the educational benefits that flow from such environments.190 The 
District Court agreed with this argument and relied on the fact that the Board had 
“precisely described the academic, social and institutional benefits it achieves 
from integrated schools” to demonstrate that it had not implemented the racial 
guidelines to achieve racial balancing “merely for its own sake.”191 This 
argument, however, fails to adequately address the potentially defeating 
counterargument that the 15%-50% racial guidelines are mechanical mandates 
intended to assure a specified percentage of African-American students in each 
school.192 Such racial mandates, which could be termed “quotas,” are absolutely 
proscribed by the Constitution.193 
185 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-330. 
186 Id. at 330. The Majority’s proffered distinction drew much disagreement from other 
Justices. See, e.g. id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning how 
the Law Schools’ interest in educational benefits is not racial balancing considering the Law 
School’s apparent belief “that only a racially mixed student body can lead to the educational 
benefits it seeks”); id. at 379, 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[s]tripped of its 
‘critical mass’ veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial 
balancing” due to its precise attention to numbers when making admissions decisions). 
187 Brief in Opposition at 17, Parents Involved, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 
789611. 
188 Id.
189 See Brief in Opposition at 14, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513. 
190 See id.
191 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 855. 
192 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. 
193 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
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As defined by the Supreme Court: 
Quotas 'impose a fixed number or percentage which must be 
attained, or which cannot be exceeded,' and ‘insulate the 
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats.’ In contrast, ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only 
a good-faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by the 
goal itself,’ and permits consideration of race as a ‘plus’ factor in 
any given case while still ensuring that each candidate 
‘compete[s] with all other qualified applicants.’194
The attainment of a student body that is composed of no fewer than 15% and no 
more than 50% African-American students is not a “goal” that the Board strives 
to achieve.  Rather, it is a fixed percentage with which schools are required to 
seek compliance.195 The respondents, in fact, state that “[t]he Plan provides that 
each school (except preschools, kindergartens, alternative and special schools, 
and the four  exempted magnet schools) shall have not less than 15% and not 
more than 50% black students.”196 Including such directive does not appear to 
comport with the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of race-conscious 
measures in public education. 
 Considering that both student assignment plans seek to create and 
maintain racially balanced schools, both are vulnerable to the Court’s 
proscription of unconstitutional racial balancing.  Now that Justice O’Connor, the 
drafter of the Grutter majority, is no longer on the bench, it is not apparent that 
the current members of the Court will accept the racially balancing test as 
articulated by the majority in Grutter. Rather, the Court may employ a more 
exacting standard to ensure that the interests motivating the utilization of 
voluntary race-conscious plans are constitutionally permissible.    
 
C. Individualized Consideration 
 
A final impediment to the constitutionality of the race-conscious plans is 
their failure to meet narrowly tailoring requirements.  As required by the standard 
of review set forth in Grutter, all admissions plans that use racial classifications 
must be narrowly tailored to further compelling interests.197 Constitutional race-
conscious admissions plans are ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity’ and “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an 
individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
 
194 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted). 
195 See supra note 122.  
196 Brief in Opposition at 3-4, Meredith, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513 
(emphasis added). 
197 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. 
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the application.” 198 Unfortunately, the race-conscious student assignment plans 
utilized in Parents Involved and Meredith fail both criteria. 
Although the Ninth Circuit held that the non-competitive context of 
elementary and secondary education does not require individualized review,199 it 
is doubtful that the Supreme Court will adopt a similar view.  While it is true that 
“context matters when reviewing” race-based measures;200 the context of 
elementary and secondary elementary does not warrant the inapplicability of 
individualized consideration.  Rather, it is, perhaps, the most pertinent context 
that necessitates individualized review. 
All racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny to guard against the 
infringement of personal rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.201 Strict scrutiny is necessary to protect individuals from the 
potential stigmatic harms imposed by group-based racial classifications.202 More 
so than in other contexts, such protections must be afforded to children in 
elementary and secondary education.  There is, perhaps, no other more necessary 
context for such protections than elementary and secondary education.  The 
potential harms that can result from telling a child that he or she cannot attend a 
particular school because he or she is of the wrong race are immeasurable.  
“Harms such as promotion of racial inferiority, strengthening of racial 
stereotypes, [and] heightening of racial hostility”203 are precisely those harms that 
the Court’s desegregation cases attempted to remedy.204 It is, therefore, highly 
improbable that the current Supreme Court would permit the use of racial 
classifications in elementary and secondary education without requiring that they 
meet every element of strict scrutiny.    
Contrary to the narrowly tailored criteria set forth in Grutter, the student 
assignment plans in question do not afford meaningful consideration to diversity 
elements other than race and ethnicity.  The District Court in McFarland argues 
that the Board’s plan is constitutional because it considers other diversity factors 
“such as place of residence and student choice of school or program.”205 Such 
argument cannot sustain the constitutionality of the plan because the operation of 
 
198 Id. at 309 (citation omitted). 
199 See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1183. 
200 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. 
201 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
202 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
203 Nelson, supra note 26, at 38.  
204 See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that legally sanctioned racial segregation 
produces feelings of inferiority, which detrimentally “affects the motivation of a child to learn”). 
205 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 859. 
Please do not quote/reproduce [Ver 1 
the plan is such that these factors are effectively irrelevant if a student attempts to 
enroll in a school where the racial composition will fall outside the racial 
guidelines if he or she is admitted.  Despite the student’s other “diversity 
factors,” he or she will most likely be denied admission.206 The racial tiebreaker 
employed in Parents Involved operates in a similar manner in that depending on 
the racial makeup of a particular school to which a student is applying for 
admission, his or her race can be the determinative factor in deciding whether he 
or she is admitted or denied.207 In both plans, race operates as the defining and 
decisive feature of a student’s application not as a constitutionally permissible 
“plus” factor.208 Therefore, the plans are not narrowly tailored and, thus, cannot 
pass constitutional scrutiny.  
 
CONCLUSION: FULFILLING BROWN’S MANDATE 
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment plans in the context of de facto racial isolation in elementary and 
secondary schools, the Supreme Court will be guided by its previous holdings 
and rationales.  As it attempts to balance the proffered interests in creating and 
maintaining racial integration against the constitutional protections provided by 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court will be guided by the 
principle that “[t]he Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to 
live together, to work together, or to send their children to school together, so 
long as the State does not interfere with their choices on the basis of race.”209 
Once the inquiry has been completed, the challenged plans will most likely be 
invalidated.  In light of this probable outcome, local, state and federal officials 
should immediately engage in the development of race-neutral programs and 
policies that can effectively address the harmful effects of resegregation of public 
schools. 
 
206 As noted by the District Court:  
[W]here the racial composition of an entire school lies near either end of the 
racial guidelines, the application of any student for open enrollment, transfer or 
even to a magnet program could be affected. In a specific case, a student's race, 
whether Black or White, could determine whether that student receives his or 
her first, second, third or fourth choice of school. 
See id. at 842. 
207 See Parents I, 377 F.3d at 955-956 (explaining that the racial tiebreaker operates to grant 
automatic admission to students who are of the preferred race needed to help schools attain the 
desired racial ratio of white and minority students). 
208 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-272 (invalidating a race-conscious admissions policy because of 
its use of race as the decisive factor in an admissions decision rather than as a “plus” factor along 
with many different diversity criteria). 
209 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). 
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School officials should not retard the progress that has been made in the 
provision of educational opportunities to minority students by paving “a one-way 
street” to racially and economically segregated neighborhood schools.210 As 
previously discussed, students attending such schools face challenges, which are 
often insurmountable, that range from less qualified teachers211 to a culture of 
lower academic expectations.212 To combat these challenges, schools should 
employ race-neutral213 student assignment plans and implement educational 
policies that effectively address deficiencies in the provision of equal educational 
opportunities to minority students. 
Some schools have already begun to experiment with race-neutral 
measures in their efforts to achieve racially diverse student bodies.214 Such 
measures include the consideration of ‘diversity in student achievement’ and 
‘diversity in socioeconomic status.’215 Limiting concentrations of low-
performing students in schools will impact student body diversity since minority 
students often perform lower than their white counterparts on academic 
measures.216 Similarly, assigning students to schools based on their 
socioeconomic status can also achieve racial diversity because of the existing 
 
210 Hampton II, 102 F.Supp.2d at 379. 
211 See supra notes 67-68, 89-95 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
213 In the context of student assignments, “race-neutral” refers to those plans that do not 
classify students based on their race or ethnicity.  Such plans are not “race-blind” in that they 
ignore the effects of race on educational opportunities.  They simply do not consider a student’s 
race when assigning him or her to a particular school. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 7-11 
(discussing the meaning of “race-neutral” alternatives in the context of higher education admissions 
decisions).  
214 See, e.g., Boger, supra note 78, at 1397-1400 (discussing the implementation of race-
neutral student assignment plans in Wake County, North Carolina).  
215 Id. at 1397. 
216 For example, in 2004, black and Hispanic children age 9, 13 and 17 had lower average 
reading scale scores than white students. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005 TBL. 108, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_108.asp.  The same was true for their 
performance in mathematics. See id, at TBL. 118, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_118.asp.  In 2001, the average geography and 
U.S. history scores for white students were higher than those achieved by black and Hispanic 
students. See id., at TBL. 116, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_116.asp. 
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racial gaps in socioeconomic status.217 Such “class-based” assignment plans are 
also beneficial because they provide the added benefit of socioeconomic 
diversity, which may, in fact, be more educationally beneficial than racial 
diversity. 
Some scholars have concluded that ‘[n]o other single social measure is 
consistently more strongly related than poverty to school achievement.’218 
Consequently, “overall socioeconomic composition of schools seem[ ] more 
predictive of academic achievement than [does] a student's individual 
socioeconomic status.”219 If this is true, school officials should direct their 
attention to achieving and maintaining socioeconomic diversity rather than racial 
diversity.  Presumably, such efforts would not be subject to the heightened and, 
potentially, fatal standard of strict scrutiny because they neither employ racial 
classifications nor seek to achieve racial diversity benefits.220 Rather, they seek 
to achieve the educational benefits of socioeconomic integration. 
In their attempts to provide equal educational opportunities to all 
students, school officials should implement policies to remedy the disparities that 
currently exist between minority, economically disadvantaged schools and their 
non-minority economically advantaged counterparts.  As often noted by many 
scholars, “[t]o those who need the best our education system has to offer, we give 
the least. The least well-trained teachers. The lowest-level curriculum. The oldest 
books. The least instructional time. Our lowest expectations. Less, indeed, of 
everything that we believe makes a difference.”221 As previously discussed, one 
glaring disparity is the level of teacher quality.222 Students attending high 
minority, low socioeconomic schools are disproportionately subjected to being 
 
217 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006 TBL. 6-1, 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section1/table.asp?tableID=440 (indicating that 
70% of black 4th-graders and 73% of Hispanic 4th-graders are eligible for free or reduced lunch, as 
compared to only 24% of white 4th-graders); see also Dickerson, supra note 94, at 1756-1758 
(noting significant racial disparities in wealth as shown by levels of home ownership, personal 
assets and business ownership). 
218 Boger, supra note 78, at 1416. 
219 Id; see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; Orfield, supra note 83, at 280 
(concluding that peer socioeconomic status accounts for more than 75% of the difference between 
minority and white students’ academic achievement).   
220 See id. at 1398-1399 (concluding that race-neutral student assignment plans should not be 
subject to strict scrutiny as long as they have not “been adopted as a mere pretext for continuing 
racial assignments”); see also Levit, supra note 38, at 511 (encouraging schools to “first try 
experiments that are more likely to be successful and less likely to be unconstitutional” in their 
efforts to achieve educational goals). 
221 See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland’s 
Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV.
1137, 1142 (1993). 
222 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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taught by lesser qualified teachers.223 Such inequitable learning environments 
negatively affects not only the quality of education that students receive224 but 
also their psychological well-being by sending and reinforcing messages ‘that 
society doesn’t care enough about whether they learn.’225 
To combat such debilitating effects, school officials should invest in the 
quality of their teachers, especially those teaching in lower-performing schools, 
by implementing initiatives that are designed to improve teacher qualifications 
and effectiveness, such as pre-service teacher education, mentoring programs and 
continual professional development.226 School officials should also provide 
incentives to encourage more qualified teachers to teach at lower-performing 
schools.  Such incentives could be immediate such as salary increases, or they 
could be long-term such as early retirement opportunities.  More qualified 
teachers may be enticed to teach at high minority, low socioeconomic schools if 
doing so afforded them the opportunity to be eligible for retirement five or ten 
years earlier than their counterparts teaching at more affluent schools.  Coupled 
with intensive recruitment efforts at the high school and college levels, schools 
implementing such beneficial policies could see a significant improvement in the 
quality of their teachers and, consequently, the academic quality of their 
students.227 
Implementing race-neutral assignment policies and teacher quality 
initiatives is merely the beginning in addressing the significant costs imposed by 
segregated learning environments.  To fulfill Brown’s mandate of educational 
equality, economically disadvantaged minority students must have the 
opportunity to interact with peers from diverse backgrounds to broaden and 
heighten their educational goals and possibilities.228 Whether or not the Supreme 
Court allows schools to facilitate this interaction through the use of race-
conscious student assignment plans, our schools and our country have the moral 
responsibility to ensure that such interaction takes place and that it occurs within 
 
223 See id; see also Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A 
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000), available at 
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n1/ (reporting findings that poor minority students are taught by less 
qualified teachers than their non-minority socially advantaged peers).   
224 See id. (concluding that student outcomes and student achievement are negatively affected 
by poor teacher quality).  
225 See Jeannie Oakes, Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis 
of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State of California 1, 9-10 available at 
http://www.decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf.  
226 See Darling-Hammond, supra note 223. 
227 See id. (describing significant student achievement gains made in North Carolina and 
Connecticut following the states’ enactment of substantial reforms targeting teacher quality). 
228 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
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educational institutions that provide all students access to equal resources 
necessary to create and fulfill their academic dreams.   
 
